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MARX, LAW, IDEOLOGY, LEGAL POSITIVISM 
Brian Leiter* 
INTRODUCTION 
HIS Article offers an account of Marx’s theory of history and his 
claim that law (and morality) are “ideological,” and then asks what 
theory of law is adequate to explain the way the Marxist theory under-
stands law in both its ideological and non-ideological senses. I will ar-
gue that legal positivism, unlike other views about the nature of law, 
provides a sensible explanation of law for purposes of the Marxist theo-
ry of historical change. This latter fact, in turn, gives us another data 
point in favor of positivism as the only serious explanation of the con-
cept of law, precisely because it is able to explain the concept of law that 
figures in one of the most important explanatory paradigms in history 
and the social sciences.  
I. LAW IN THE MARXIST THEORY OF HISTORICAL CHANGE 
Both “law” and “morality” are typically denominated as part of the 
ideological superstructure in the Marxian theory of historical transfor-
mation. According to what I will refer to as the “Orthodox Functional-
ist” version of the theory (most clearly stated in the 1859 Preface to 
Marx’s, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, and given 
systematic exposition by G. A. Cohen in 19781), any socioeconomic or-
der has three important characteristics. First, there is the level of devel-
opment of the forces of production, the means by which human beings 
produce everything that they need and (at later stages) want.2 The forces 
 
* Karl N. Llewellyn Professor of Jurisprudence and Director of the Center for Law, Phi-
losophy & Human Values, University of Chicago. I am grateful to Professor David Brink 
and members of the audience at a meeting of the Central Division of the American Philo-
sophical Association in Chicago in February 2014; and to the participants in the conference 
on “Jurisprudence and (Its) History” at the University of Virginia School of Law, including 
Professors Deborah Hellman, David Luban, Gerald Postema, Alice Ristroph, and, especially, 
Professor Mark Murphy. I have also been helped by an exchange with Professor Charles 
Barzun and an extensive correspondence with Professor Stefan Sciaraffa about the issues in 
this Article. Finally, my sincere thanks to Phil Smoke, University of Chicago Law School 
Class of 2015, for meticulous research assistance. 
1 G. A. Cohen, Karl Marx’s Theory of History: A Defence, at x (1978). 
2 Id. at 32. 
T
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of production include human labor power—a relative constant in history, 
except to the extent that humans grow somewhat taller and stronger over 
time—and, more importantly, what we may call “technology,” namely, 
all the tools by which human labor power expands its productive output, 
from the shovel to the steam engine to the computer.3 The Marxist theo-
ry assumes, not implausibly, that the forces of production grow in pro-
ductive power over time, and that assumption is crucial to the entire the-
ory.4 
Second, there are the relations of production, which we can, follow-
ing Professor Jon Elster,5 think of as the “property rights” characteristic 
of a particular socioeconomic order. In particular, the crucial question is 
the distribution of property rights in the forces of production.6 For ex-
ample, do persons have property rights in their labor power (as under 
capitalism) or do others own their labor power (as under feudalism)? 
Who owns the major forms of technology and mechanical production? 
In the classic Marxist theory, the “proletariat” own only their labor pow-
er, while the “bourgeoisie” own all the other forces of production and 
purchase the labor power of the proletariat for a survival wage. Under 
feudalism, feudal lords own all the forces of production, including the 
labor power of serfs as well as their tools.7 In twenty-first-century capi-
talism, those who own and sell their labor power often get more than 
survival wages—law professors are but one example—and while the 
other forces of production are largely owned by a small number of pri-
vate individuals, many others have partial stakes (through stock owner-
ship) in small portions of the forces of production. 
Third, and finally, there is the ideological superstructure of society, 
which includes moral, political, legal, and religious ideas. The crucial 
claim of the Orthodox Functionalist version of the Marxist theory of his-
tory concerns the relationship among the three components. According 
to this theory, what explains the content of the ideological superstructure 
is that it contributes to legitimizing and thus stabilizing the relations of 
production (it does so by presenting those relations as, inter alia, just, 
fair, natural, inevitable, or some or all of the preceding); and what ex-
plains the nature of the relations of productions is that they contribute to 
 
3 Id.  
4 Id. at x–xi.  
5 Jon Elster, An Introduction to Karl Marx 106 (1986). 
6 Cohen, supra note 1, at 63.  
7 Id. at 65.  
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maximizing the use and development of the forces of production.8 His-
torical transformations occur when, in the Marxian metaphor, the rela-
tions of production “fetter” the further growth of the forces of produc-
tion, that is, when the existing scheme of property rights hinders further 
exploitation and development of new technologies. So, for example, at 
some point feudal relations of production were incompatible with ex-
ploiting forms of production made possible through steam and water 
power (as well as mechanical tools), thus giving the nascent bourgeoisie 
an incentive to overthrow the feudal relations of production in order to 
allow them to effectively exploit these new productive forces.9 
Note that for jurisprudential purposes, the theory of historical materi-
alism does not need to be true (the theory is highly illuminating, more so 
than most theories of history, but like every other general theory of all 
historical change, false); all that is required is that the theory makes 
claims about the nature of law that are intelligible and not nonsensical, 
such that it is reasonable to ask what theory of law is compatible with 
the claims of historical materialism. Marx’s theory easily satisfies that 
standard.10 Given that, we need to be able to say what the law is in three 
contexts for the Marxian theory: 
(1) there are the laws that constitute the relations of production, that is, 
the scheme of property rights in the existing forces of production; 
(2) there are the laws (and associated legal beliefs, for example, “you 
are entitled to equal protection of the law”) that are superstructural 
and ideological in the pejorative sense; and, 
(3) there are the laws that are non-ideological and superstructural be-
cause they characterize the legal relations of a non-class-based, that is, 
a communist, society. 
The last category requires some further explanation. Contrary to Marx’s 
occasional utopian speculations, there is no reason to think that com-
munist societies would not have both law and morality. Only the case of 
law need concern us right now (I will return to the case of morality). As 
 
8 Id. at 28, 31. 
9 Hugh Collins offers a more subtle account of this, but ultimately makes the same point in 
Marxism and Law. Hugh Collins, Marxism and Law 21 (1982).  
10 On what is true, and what is probably not true, see Brian Leiter, The Hermeneutics of 
Suspicion: Recovering Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud, in The Future for Philosophy 74, 79–80, 
84–86 (Brian Leiter ed., 2004). 
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Joseph Raz argued forty years ago,11 even a “society of angels” would 
have need of law: not because angels would ever be inclined to do the 
wrong thing (angels never need to be coerced), but because even angels 
need systematic guidance to coordinate their activities effectively in the 
service of the common good. Angels need to know which side of the 
road to drive on, which day to put out the recyclable garbage, and how 
to dispose of their property after their death to those they want to inherit 
it. Communist societies will be no different, and not because Marx as-
sumes that individuals in such societies will be “angels”; rather, he as-
sumes that, in the absence of the need for constant competition for eco-
nomic survival, individuals will behave quite a bit differently than they 
do under capitalism. But such individuals will have the same needs as 
those in Raz’s “society of angels” (including the need for post-mortem 
distribution of their property, since communist societies only eliminate 
personal property in other people’s labor and in the forces of production, 
including land, but not property in, inter alia, your furniture, your heir-
looms, and the like). 
One suspects that the theory of law adequate to account for the con-
cept of law in its first role in Marx’s theory will be adequate to account 
for its third role: In these two cases, that norms are norms of law does 
not seem to require any judgment about their merits, favorable or unfa-
vorable. But the second case is different: Calling law “ideological” is, in 
the Marxian theory, pejorative, though in a sense we will need to speci-
fy. Once again, it would seem a theory of law that is neutral on the mer-
its of legally valid norms will have an advantage in explaining the pejo-
rative sense of ideological law. Let us turn then to the notion of 
ideology. 
II. IDEOLOGY 
What makes law or morality “ideological,” in Marx’s clearly pejora-
tive sense of that term? For reasons of both time and space, I am not go-
ing to venture into questions of textual interpretation.12 Instead, I want to 
 
11 Joseph Raz, Practical Reason and Norms 159 (1975). 
12 I have found the following instructive: Raymond Geuss, The Idea of a Critical Theory: 
Habermas and the Frankfurt School (1981); Michael N. Forster, Ideology, in The Oxford 
Handbook of German Philosophy in the Nineteenth Century (Michael N. Forster & Kristin 
Gjesdal eds., forthcoming 2015); Tommie Shelby, Ideology, Racism, and Critical Social 
Theory, 34 Phil. F. 153 (2003); Jaime Edwards, The Concept of Ideology (Ph.D. dissertation 
in progress, University of Chicago). 
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focus on what I take to be the philosophically interesting core of the 
Marxist theory of ideology—I will call it, accordingly, the “Marxian” 
theory of ideology, leaving for another day the question of whether this 
is the best interpretation of everything Marx said on the matter.13 
On the Marxian theory, an “ideology” in the pejorative sense is an in-
ferentially related set of beliefs about the character of the social, politi-
cal, and economic world that has two characteristics: (1) it falsely repre-
sents what are really the interests of a particular economic class as being 
in the general interest (call this “the Interests Mistake”); and (2) the In-
terests Mistake is possible because those who accept the ideology are 
mistaken about (or ignorant of) how they came to hold those beliefs (call 
this “the Genetic Mistake”).14 What makes a set of beliefs with these 
characteristics “ideological” in a pejorative sense is not simply that it 
involves mistakes—mistakes are extremely common in the cognitive 
economy of any person—but that the mistakes affect the interests of the 
agent; that is, they are the kinds of mistakes that anyone concerned 
about their actual interests would want to correct. And because of that, 
continued credence in the ideology would not be compatible with under-
standing its actual genesis, since if those in the grips of the ideology un-
derstood the actual causal process by which they came to hold these per-
nicious beliefs they would no longer accept them. (Why etiology of 
belief bears on its acceptability is a point to which we will return.)  
Here is an example that will help make concrete what is at stake in the 
Marxian theory of ideology: 
A. Members of the “Tea Party” in the United States believe that low 
taxes are in the general interest (meaning, in particular, that they are 
in the interest of the lower- and middle-class people who make up 
large portions of the Tea Party). 
B. Members of the “Tea Party” are mistaken: Low taxes are not in 
their interest, since middle- and lower-class people depend on Social 
Security, Medicare, public schools, public parks, and other facilities 
 
13 Edwards, supra note 12, and Forster, supra note 12, are better on the interpretive ques-
tions.  
14 Geuss gets this almost right in The Idea of a Critical Theory, except his “epistemic” 
sense of ideology is overbroad: The Interests Mistake is not an epistemic mistake except in 
the trivial sense that it is false; but all ideologies involve false beliefs, and so if an epistemic 
mistake is not confined to a mistake about justification, the “epistemic” sense swallows all 
the others. Geuss, supra note 12, at 26–30. 
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that satisfy the needs and desires of most people and that can only be 
funded at adequate levels if taxes are higher, especially on the 
wealthy.15 
C. Members of the “Tea Party” are mistaken about which policies are 
in their interest because (in part) they are mistaken about how they 
came to believe (A); that is, they do not realize the extent to which 
propaganda by the ruling classes led them to their false belief. If they 
realized the extent to which, for example, billionaires fund advertising 
and candidates to promote the belief in (A) because it serves the inter-
est of billionaires,16 they would no longer be able to believe (A). 
Nothing depends for our purposes on whether this is correct, though it is 
prima facie plausible. What matters is that it illustrates the conceptual 
structure of the claim that certain moral, political, or legal ideas might be 
ideological. 
III. LAW AND MORALITY IN THE NON-IDEOLOGICAL SENSE 
The preceding account of ideology creates conceptual space for a 
non-ideological sense of both morality and law in the Marxian theory. 
That is, moral or legal ideas can be non-ideological insofar as (1) they 
do not falsely represent the interests of a particular economic class as in 
the general interest; and/or (2) the acceptability of these ideas does not 
depend on obscuring their genesis in class-specific interests. If legal or 
moral ideas do not represent the interests of a particular class as being in 
the general interest, then it is easy to see why these ideas would not be 
pejoratively ideological. But the second point is of equal importance, 
since Marx presents (as we will see) communism as promoting class-
 
15 The complete account would require a more detailed theory of interests, though for pur-
poses here it is reasonable to assume that human needs and desires of the kind noted will 
play some role in an account of the interests of persons in the United States. 
16 A good example is the front organization for the Koch Brothers, “Americans for Prosperi-
ty,” which advocates for lower taxes on the wealthy and fewer regulations. See Dave Johnson, 
Meet the Billionaires Using Their Immense Wealth to Make Life Miserable for Ordinary 
Americans, Alternet (Feb. 19, 2014), http://www.alternet.org/economy/meet-billionaires-using-
their-immense-wealth-make-life-miserable-ordinary-americans listing billionaires that are back-
ing campaigns to lower the budget deficit, cut public employee pensions, control redistricting, 
give more voting power to the wealthy, and drive down pay for employees). To be sure, billion-
aires may genuinely believe that these policies are in the general interest, but this false belief is 
easy to explain given well-known self-serving and wish-fulfillment biases to which humans are 
subject. 
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specific interests—the interests of the vast majority—yet does not think 
communist ideology is an ideology in the pejorative sense. Why not? 
Consider, to start, a quite different case. Suppose that we have the 
empirical science we have because it is in the interests of the ruling class 
that we have this empirical science. This is probably true: Many (maybe 
all) members of the capitalist class have a powerful economic interest in 
a correct understanding of the causal laws governing the natural world 
for obvious reasons, so they have a reason to encourage an epistemically 
reliable empirical science that gives them the understanding essential for 
effective, productive exploitation of the natural world.17 This fact—
assuming it is a fact—about the genesis of our empirical science would 
not affect its acceptability, however. The acceptability of empirical sci-
ence depends on epistemic criteria (such as evidential warrant, explana-
tory power, and predictive success), and not on whether the resulting 
claims are genuinely in everyone’s interest. So it can be true that we 
have the empirical science we have because it is in the interest of our 
capitalist overlords, and that fact would not affect the epistemic accepta-
bility of the claims of that science. 
Moral and (many) legal claims are different from the claims of empir-
ical science in this regard. If we accept them as legitimate or warranted 
only because of a mistake about their class-interest-specific genesis, then 
discovering that fact makes them unacceptable, since moral and legal 
claims are almost always presented as committed to a basic equality of 
interests. So, for example, if the reason current U.S. free speech doctrine 
protects unrestricted spending by the wealthy in elections18 is because 
this ensures that the political system does the bidding of plutocrats,19 
 
17 See Peter Railton, Marx and the Objectivity of Science, in The Philosophy of Science 
763, 769 (Richard Boyd et al. eds., 1991).  
18 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 319 (2010); Buckley v. Valeo, 
424 U.S. 1, 23, 45, 64 (1976). 
19 How might that turn out to be the reason—the causal explanation—for why this is current 
legal doctrine in the U.S.? The mechanism is complex. To start with, the U.S. Supreme Court 
functions as a super-legislature, something both political parties have understood for a long 
time, see Brian Leiter, Constitutional Law, Moral Judgment, and the Supreme Court as Super-
Legislature (Jan. 10, 2015) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2547972), and thus appointments to the super-legislature inherit 
the plutocratic biases of the political system as a whole: So, for example, far-right U.S. presi-
dents like Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and George W. Bush nominate judges friendly 
to the prerogatives of the ruling classes, while moderate-right U.S. presidents like Clinton nom-
inate judges not hostile to those prerogatives. In addition, of course, there is ample empirical 
evidence that the super-legislature known as the Supreme Court follows the political currents in 
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then most people have no reason to affirm the free speech value of un-
limited political spending by the wealthy: If free speech is a value, it 
must be good for everyone, not just the wealthy. (Notice that what is at 
stake is the moral status or acceptability of the legal claim: The status of 
the claim qua legal does not depend on these considerations.) So, too, 
with moral prescriptions and proscriptions: In both utilitarian and deon-
tological versions, they present themselves as objective demands not 
hostage to the interests of particular persons. If the acceptability of such 
norms depends on obscuring the fact that they serve the interests of only 
certain persons, then such norms would cease to be acceptable. 
To sum up, in the Marxian theory, norms (moral or legal) are ideolog-
ical insofar as (1) we have the norms we have because it is in the inter-
ests of the dominant class that we have them; (2) we are unaware of the 
truth of (1); and (3) being aware of the truth of (1) is incompatible with 
continued belief in those norms being acceptable. 
The preceding goes a long way towards explaining why Marx con-
sistently presents the communist normative point of view as a class-
specific one. (I take Marx to be a kind of consequentialist welfarist with 
regard to what we would call “moral” questions; that is, he thinks the 
right thing to do is what would maximize the well-being of the vast ma-
jority of humanity. He does not argue for this, since he believes, correct-
ly, that normative theorizing is irrelevant to revolutionary practice: Of 
course, the vast majority of humanity will be interested in maximizing 
its well-being!20 The real aim of theory is to help the vast majority un-
derstand the actual obstacles to realizing its well-being Marx describes, 
for example, “the proletarian movement” as simply being “in the inter-
ests of the immense majority.”21 “The Communists fight for . . . the 
momentary interests of the working class.”22 Marx derides the German 
“True” Socialists (though he might just as well have been thinking of 
Habermas) for thinking that socialism reflects “the requirements of 
truth; not the interests of the proletariat, but the interests of Human Na-
 
the country as a whole—for one compelling, qualitative study, see Lucas A. Powe, Jr., The 
Warren Court and American Politics, at xii–xiv (2000)—and thus the extent to which the dom-
inant public culture is shaped by plutocratic interests will manifest itself in the ideas and values 
that predominate and, in turn, influence the Court. 
20 See Brian Leiter, Marxism and the Continuing Irrelevance of Normative Theory, 54 
Stan. L. Rev. 1129, 1136–37 (2002).  
21 Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party (1848), reprinted in 
The Marx-Engels Reader 469, 482 (Robert C. Tucker ed., 2d ed. 1978).  
22 Id. at 499. 
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ture, of Man in general, who belongs to no class, has no reality, who ex-
ists only in the misty realm of philosophical fantasy.”23 And he derides 
Critical-Utopian Socialists for “consider[ing] themselves far superior to 
all class antagonisms. They want to improve the condition of every 
member of society, even that of the most favoured.”24 And similarly: 
 The theoretical conclusions of the Communists are in no way based 
on ideas or principles that have been invented, or discovered, by this 
or that would-be universal reformer. 
 They merely express, in general terms, actual relations springing 
from an existing class struggle, from a historical movement going on 
under our very eyes.25 
So the ethical imperatives of the Communist movement represent a 
class-interest-specific morality, just one in the interests of the vast ma-
jority, as opposed to the ruling class. And this morality is not ideological 
because its acceptability also does not depend on its not being class-
interest-specific—indeed, there is no mistake about its genesis either: 
“The proletarian movement is the self-conscious, independent move-
ment of the immense majority, in the interests of the immense majori-
ty.”26 
Notice that an upshot of this way of thinking about Marx’s own ethi-
cal views is that it follows that the ethical imperatives of the communist 
movement would not necessarily constitute the morality of a communist 
society. What such a morality would be is something that will simply 
have to be discovered in the course of historical developments, since, as 
Engels says, “all moral theories have been . . . the product . . . of the 
economic conditions of society obtaining at the time.”27 Only under 
communist relations of production would individuals actually discover 
the morality appropriate to a non-class society. The same is going to be 
true of law, I take it. That is, whatever moral and legal norms are neces-
sary to guide the affairs of a human community in which people are not 
continuously engaged in the struggle for economic survival, we will dis-
cover them under those future conditions (assuming they are attainable). 
 
23 Id. at 494. 
24 Id. at 498. 
25 Id. at 484. 
26 Id. at 482. 
27 Id. at 726. 
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But both legal and moral norms in such conditions will not be ideologi-
cal in the pejorative sense that Marx critiques. 
IV. WHAT THEORY OF LAW IS ADEQUATE TO THE MARXIAN ACCOUNT? 
While Marx has, as I suggested above, recognizable ethical views 
(consequentialist welfarism), he does not advocate for particular legal 
views. Law is not the instrumentality of communist revolution, obvious-
ly. The general Marxian theory does, however, require us to be able to 
say what the law is in three contexts, as noted earlier: (1) we have to be 
able to identify laws that constitute the relations of production; (2) we 
have to able to identify laws (and associated beliefs about the law) that 
are ideological in the pejorative sense; and (3) we have to be able to 
identify law that is non-ideological because it characterizes the legal re-
lations of a non-class-based society. Only a positivist theory of law is 
adequate to these tasks; the best-known non-positivist theory, that of 
Professor Ronald Dworkin, is not. Indeed, Dworkin is, in Marxian 
terms, an ideologist, someone who tries to systematize ideological illu-
sions. 
A positivist theory of law claims that what law is in any society is a 
matter of certain complicated psycho-social facts; more precisely, 
(1) law is whatever satisfies the criteria of the “rule of recognition” 
characteristic of a legal system, and (2) the “rule of recognition” consists 
of the criteria that officials actually apply in deciding what the law is 
and which officials treat as obligatory (rightly or wrongly). For the 
Marxian, one virtue of the theory is that it is silent on whether the valid 
law or the criteria of legal validity are justified, good, obligatory, or au-
thoritative. Thus, a positivist theory can describe (1) the laws that consti-
tute the relations of production, even the relations of production of so-
cieties that harm the well-being of the vast majority; (2) law that is 
ideological in the pejorative sense; and (3) the law characteristic of a 
non-class-based society. In all three cases, the legally valid norms will 
be whichever norms are picked out by the rule of recognition (as consti-
tuted by the official practice); what distinguishes the three cases will be, 
respectively, whether (1) the norms are constitutive of the relations of 
production; (2) the norms are ideological, in the sense defined in the pri-
or section; and (3) the norms are those of a communist society.28  
 
28 Why not say, though, that it suffices for Marx’s purposes if we view as “law” whatever 
norms are enforced by officials, full stop? It is hard to see how this could be an adequate 
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There are few serious alternatives to the positivist theory of law, despite 
a voluminous and somewhat notoriously confused secondary literature.29 
Natural law theorists like Professor John Finnis effectively concede the 
correctness of the positivist theory for the questions it was trying to an-
swer,30 while others, like Professor Mark Murphy, admit that the only 
remotely plausible natural law thesis—the “Weak Natural Law Thesis,” 
according to which necessarily law is practically reasonable means 
something like normal (or central) instances of law are practically rea-
sonable—is not obviously incompatible with positivism, as Murphy ad-
mits.31 That latter concession might, however, give Murphy’s view an 
advantage, even if I am right that the positivist view fits Marxian claims 
about law. For on Murphy’s view, only defective instances of law are 
practically deficient (that is, morally unacceptable), and one might sup-
pose that, on the Marxian view, it is precisely capitalist legal systems 
that are morally deficient, since they fail to maximize human well-being, 
and thus a view of law like Murphy’s—which does not reject the posi-
 
general theory of law, for reasons Hart identified, but, more to the point, it is plainly not the 
case that “ideological” law for the Marxian theory is necessarily enforced: Often its ideolog-
ical character consists precisely of the fact that while officials cite the norm and employ it 
for rhetorical flourish, they do not actually enforce it at all. Thanks to Professor Stefan Sci-
araffa for a useful correspondence on these issues. 
29 I have come to the view after twenty years as a “professional philosopher” that there is 
no subfield of Anglophone philosophy as intellectually corrupt and confused as general ju-
risprudence. There is, to be sure, a serious body of work that arose from Hart’s transfor-
mation of the field a half century ago, but then there has been an extraordinary outpouring of 
fraudulent misrepresentation and rhetorical nonsense. This is partly due to the subfield being 
small, and partly due to the fact that its two main non-positivist figures were Dworkin (a 
gifted sophist, in the pejorative sense of the latter term) and Professor John Finnis (a far 
more responsible scholar than Dworkin, but one whose Catholic dogmatism had a pernicious 
influence on too much of his work). General jurisprudence is largely moribund as a serious 
field of inquiry. (I exempt from this charge certain recent interdisciplinary developments in 
general jurisprudence that are of general philosophical interest, such as work drawing on 
metaethics and philosophy of language.) 
30 Finnis admits that positivism gives the correct account of “what any competent law-
yer . . . would say are (or are not) intra-systematically valid laws, imposing ‘legal require-
ments.’” John Finnis, On the Incoherence of Legal Positivism, 75 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1597, 
1611 (2000). Finnis complains instead that positivism does not have an adequate answer to 
questions it was not asking, such as when there is a moral obligation to obey the law. See the 
critical discussion in Brian Leiter, Naturalizing Jurisprudence: Essays on American Legal 
Realism and Naturalism in Legal Philosophy 163–64, 193–94 (2007). Finnis, alas, is a mas-
ter of quietly changing the topic and the question to make it appear as if he is having a dis-
pute with the positivist. 
31 Mark C. Murphy, Natural Law Theory, in The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Law 
and Legal Theory 15, 18, 21–23 (Martin P. Golding & William A. Edmundson eds., 2005). 
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tivist insight, but which acknowledges gradations of law from the “nor-
mal” to the “defective”—is actually better suited to the Marxian view. 
This possibility raises two interesting issues. First, is Murphy’s argu-
ment for the Weak Natural Law Thesis—for the idea that there are “de-
fective” and “normal” instances of law—sound? I am skeptical it is, but 
for reasons that would derail the discussion and which I will confine to a 
long footnote.32 Second, even if the Weak Natural Law Thesis were true, 
it is not clear that the normal-defective distinction it contemplates actu-
ally plays a role in the Marxian explanatory theory. After all, on the 
Weak Natural Law view, normal instances of law are morally reasona-
ble, whereas on the Marxian view, no law prior to communism could 
possibly satisfy the relevant consequentialist welfarist standard: The his-
tory of the world, prior to communism, is the history of “defective” in-
stances of law. And that is a problem since, from the standpoint of the 
explanatory ambitions of the Marxian theory, defective instances of law 
can serve their ideological functions—for example, legitimizing rela-
 
32 Murphy notes that it seems sensible to say that normal cheetahs run fast, and thus that a 
cheetah that doesn’t run fast is a defective instance of the kind of animal a cheetah is. Id. at 
21. In the case of a biological species, we know how to mark the distinction between normal 
and defective instances of the kind of biological entity it is: We can appeal to both genetics 
and to the evolutionary history of the organism to explain why normal members of the kind 
have both the phenotypic (observable) and genotypic (not observable) properties they have. 
Biology and genetics will be no help in the case of “law,” as Murphy recognizes. On Mur-
phy’s view, “law’s characteristic . . . is to provide” reasons for action with which subjects 
have a moral obligation to comply, so a legal system that fails to provide such guidance is a 
defective instance of law. Id at 27. But why is law the kind of institution that provides moral-
ly obligatory reasons for acting? Murphy writes: 
[T]he background from which human institutions are to be assessed . . . is one in 
which humans are properly functioning. But human beings are rational animals, and 
when properly functioning act on what the relevant reasons require. And so law would 
not be able to realize the end of order by giving dictates in a world in which humans 
are properly functioning unless those dictates were backed by adequate reasons. Thus 
we should say that it is law’s characteristic activity to provide dictates backed by 
compelling reasons for action, and that law that fails to do so is defective as law. 
Id. We can grant Murphy’s (dubious) claim that “properly functioning” humans act only on 
good practical reasons, and yet still object that “to realize the end of order,” law must be the 
kind of institution that is responsive to how human beings actually are, which is a world in 
which they are not “properly functioning,” in which they are not “angels.” So what is really 
crucial to the kind of institution law is is that it is able to guide and structure conduct, and 
produce order, even in the actual world, where humans are neither particularly rational nor 
particularly moral.  
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tions of production—despite being suboptimal from the point of view of 
Marxian consequentialist welfarism.33 
If the preceding is correct, then we are left with only one systemati-
cally articulated view in the literature that is genuinely antipositivist, 
namely, that of the late Ronald Dworkin. According to Dworkin, the law 
is whatever follows from the moral principles that provide the best ex-
planation and justification of law in roughly the positivist sense (that is, 
the institutional history of the legal system, as I will refer to it).34 
Dworkin’s view is not, as it is often presented by casual readers, that “at 
least in hard cases, [judges] can’t merely ‘follow the law,’ because there 
isn’t anything to ‘follow.’ What they have to do is produce a principle 
that both fits and justifies the existing legal materials.”35 Dworkin’s view 
is that law, in every case, is whatever would follow from the moral prin-
ciples that provide the “best” explanation and justification of the pre-
existing positive law. Among other things, that means that no one may 
actually know what the law is, since no one may have identified the 
moral principle that provides what is really the best explanation and jus-
tification of the earlier positive law. 
For Dworkin, the idea of the best moral justification of the institution-
al history of the legal system is a moral realist (or objectivist) one: Giv-
en those principles that explain some significant enough portion of the 
prior cases, statutes, administrative rulings, and so on, the one that really 
provides the best moral justification of the legal system is the one that 
determines what the law is on a particular question—not the one people 
around here happen to think provides the best moral justification, but the 
one that really does, even if no one knows it. This means that, on 
Dworkin’s view, no norms can be legally valid unless they are above 
some threshold of objective moral justifiability. Often Dworkin, and es-
pecially the handful of Dworkinians still around, tend to be coy on this 
point. But there is no reason to be coy, since Dworkin himself was ex-
plicit that a satisfactory analysis of the concept of law must explain why 
the exercise of coercive power in accordance with law is morally justi-
 
33 Thanks to Professor Mark Murphy for helpful correspondence on this issue, though he 
should not be presumed to agree with what I say in the text. 
34 Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire 7, 68–70 (1986).  
35 Cass R. Sunstein, The Most Important Legal Philosopher of Our Time, Bloomberg View 
(Feb. 15, 2013, 6:14 PM), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2013-02-15/the-most-
important-legal-philosopher-of-our-time. 
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fied.36 Thus, Dworkin is keen to urge us to acknowledge that for some 
societies, “in spite of the existence of familiar legal institutions like leg-
islatures and courts,” if “the practices of these institutions are too wick-
ed,” they may not deserve the title of “law.”37 And he dismisses, without 
any actual argument, the ordinary view that says if “the Nazis had law,” 
it was simply “very bad law.”38 Dworkin dismisses this as a “fact about 
our linguistic practice”39 and so not a meaningful constraint on theoriz-
ing about the nature of law. Everyone in polite society agrees, of course, 
that Nazis are not morally justified in coercing people to murder Jews, 
even under the color of law; but no one other than Dworkin and a hand-
ful of Dworkinians think that when the Nazis enacted antisemitic and 
genocidal laws, they were not really laws. To be sure, we could stipulate 
that, but then we are doing something different: not trying to figure out 
what the folk around here mean when they engage in “law talk,” but try-
ing to prescribe when the honorific “law” should attach to certain nor-
mative standards. Armchair sociology is even less robust than actual so-
ciology, yet even so, I really have never met anyone who has not fallen 
through the Dworkinian looking-glass who actually thinks it is an open 
question whether ordinary lawyers describe the Nazis as having laws, 
just bad ones. 
Notice, now, the problem this creates for a Dworkinian attempt to ex-
plain the concept of law in Marx’s historical materialism: For “law,” on 
Dworkin’s anti-positivist view, cannot fall below some standard of mor-
al defensibility. Start with the nature of the laws constitutive of the rela-
tions of production in capitalist society. Whatever precisely Marx 
thought about the moral status of capitalism, he certainly would not have 
thought it is morally defensible, either from the standpoint of the class-
interest-specific morality of the proletariat or from the standpoint of the 
morality that will ultimately characterize a communist society. The posi-
tivist theory of law has no conceptual difficulty with this: The law con-
stituting the relations of production (that is, the scheme of property 
rights) is whatever the officials of the system validate as legally binding 
from an “internal point of view.” That the capitalist officials contribute 
to wickedness by validating property rights in the labor power of other 
 
36 Dworkin, supra note 34, at 190. 
37 Id. at 101. 
38 Id. at 102. 
39 Id. 
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human beings is not a problem for the positivist theory, but it appears to 
be for Dworkin. 
I suppose the Dworkinian might object that the laws creating capital-
ist relations of productions are not, in fact, morally objectionable (or do 
not fall below the threshold of moral acceptability necessary for them to 
be law) and that Marx is simply mistaken in his appraisal of them. This 
would be a reasonable response, given the ideological character of 
Dworkin’s philosophy (more on that in a moment). This would require 
the Dworkinian to defend the objective correctness of bourgeois ethical 
judgments as against Marxist ones, and since the history of moral phi-
losophy is the history of specious arguments on behalf of differing moral 
attitudes,40 one suspects such “defenses” could be mounted. But from the 
standpoint of theoretical simplicity—still a virtue in theory-
construction—it is far preferable to have a theory of law (like the posi-
tivist one) that does not need to adjudicate the normative merits of 
Marxian and Dworkinian views but can nonetheless individuate phe-
nomena crucial to historical explanations. 
Dworkin’s theory has considerably more difficulty explaining Marx’s 
idea that law is part of the ideological superstructure of society. “Law” 
is ideological, recall, insofar as it is guilty of the Interests Mistake and 
the Genetic Mistake. More precisely, certain aspects of the law in capi-
talist societies are ideological in the sense that their claim to normative 
authority (not necessarily legal validity) depends on their being per-
ceived as being in the interests of all economic classes and on the fact 
that they are not recognized, correctly, to really be only in the interest of 
the dominant economic class. Since ideological legal norms fail precise-
ly on the dimension of respect for the equality of interests of persons, 
they could not possibly be morally justified on a Dworkinian view 
which treats equality of interests as morally paramount.41 The 
Dworkinian view—which collapses legal validity and normative au-
thority—must deny that such norms are really legally valid. But in so 
doing, it renders incoherent the perfectly intelligible Marxian claim that 
some of the laws characteristic of capitalist societies are ideological in 
Marx’s pejorative sense. 
 
40 See Brian Leiter, Moral Skepticism and Moral Disagreement in Nietzsche, in 9 Oxford 
Studies in Metaethics 126, 131–39 (Russ Shafer-Landau ed., 2014). 
41 See Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality 1–3, 6–7 
(2000). 
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Ironically, perhaps, the Dworkinian view fares best with the status of 
“law” in communist societies. In communist societies, neither “law” nor 
“morality” is ideological in character since neither is class-interest-
specific and neither depends on ignorance about its genesis for its ac-
ceptability. In such a society, it would not be surprising if the legally 
valid norms (for example, “drive on the right, not on the left”) were also 
morally justifiable. Of course, the Dworkinian might think that the 
standards of moral justifiability in a communist society are not, in fact, 
justifiable from the standpoint of the bourgeois morality Dworkin en-
dorses, and so even in this case the Dworkinian might have trouble ex-
plaining legal validity. Certainly nothing in Dworkin’s voluminous writ-
ings on issues of equality and politics suggests that he is anything other 
than a liberal apologist for the capitalist system, and so a loyal 
Dworkinian probably should conclude that the laws of a communist so-
ciety are not morally justifiable, and so not really laws. But perhaps if 
we discount the actual Dworkin’s bourgeois prejudices, it could turn out 
that legal validity in a communist society might incorporate moral con-
siderations—not class-specific moral considerations, of course, but those 
characteristics of a non-class-based society—and thus that something 
like the Dworkinian view (or what Hart took to be the “Soft Positivist” 
view42) prevailed. This would be a somewhat tepid victory for the 
Dworkinian view, since it would require repudiating the substance of the 
actual Dworkin’s moral commitments. 
CONCLUSION 
None of what I have argued here should really be surprising. One of 
the many virtues of the positivist theory of law, as Hart noted more than 
a half century ago,43 is that it allows us to pick out an important social 
phenomenon—normative organization of society by law—that admits of 
psychological, sociological, economic, and philosophical analysis and 
critique without prejudging any questions about the value, justifiability, 
or moral propriety of such organization. Dworkin, by contrast, was al-
ways, and obviously, an apologist for the capitalist system in his legal 
and political philosophy: Various incantations about “equal concern” 
 
42 See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 250–54 (Penelope A. Bulloch & Joseph Raz eds., 
3d ed. 2012). 
43 See Hart’s discussion of the “theoretical” virtues of his positivism in The Concept of 
Law. Id. at 207–12. 
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add up to nothing more than a call for more redistributive taxation.44 In-
deed, it is worse than that: We are offered, by Dworkin, the absurd im-
age of the legal community of “integrity” as like an enormous family, in 
which associative obligations to obey the law arise because of the “equal 
concern” enjoyed by everyone.45 Dworkin articulated this vision in the 
midst of the reactionary “Reagan Revolution” in the United States, when 
labor unions were busted, progressive taxation was rolled back, laws 
regulating rapacious capitalists were eviscerated, and America went de-
cidedly “off the rails” as a civilized democracy. In trying to present 
“law” in these circumstances as above some standard of moral justifia-
bility, Dworkin was the quintessential “ideologist” in the Marxian sense: 
He told a story about law that obscured, from top to bottom, what was 
actually happening in the society at large. 
The late Professor G.A. Cohen, a brilliant scholar and philosopher, 
led Anglophone Marxism into Christian moralizing in his late work, as I 
have argued elsewhere.46 But he correctly diagnosed the moral hypocrisy 
of Dworkin (and Dworkin’s friends and colleagues like Thomas Nagel) 
in his book If You’re an Egalitarian, How Come You’re So Rich?47 The 
title was a jab at Dworkin, who owned real estate fit for plutocrats in 
both London and New York while pontificating about equality. The jab 
was apt for reasons that Nagel himself acknowledged: 
 I have to admit that, although I am an adherent of the liberal con-
ception [of justice and equality, like Dworkin], I don’t have an answer 
to Cohen’s charge of moral incoherence. It is hard [as a bourgeois lib-
eral] to render consistent the exemption of private choice from the mo-
tives that support redistributive public policies. I could sign a standing 
banker’s order to give away everything I earn above the national aver-
age, for example, and it wouldn’t kill me. I could even try to increase 
my income at the same time, knowing the excess would go to people 
who needed it more than I did. I’m not about to do anything of the 
kind, but the equality-friendly justifications I can think of for not do-
ing so all strike me as rationalizations.48 
 
44 Dworkin, supra note 41, at 1–2. 
45 Dworkin, supra note 34, at 200, 206–08. 
46 Leiter, supra note 10, at 79–84, 87–89. 
47 G. A. Cohen, If You’re an Egalitarian, How Come You’re So Rich? (2000). 
48 Thomas Nagel, Concealment and Exposure: And Other Essays 112 (2002). 
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This is admirably candid, but it also stands as an indictment of a whole 
generation of moral and political philosophy in the Anglophone world. 
More importantly for our purposes, it confirms the ideological character 
of so much normative philosophical work: Its normative commitments 
do not affect the practice of those who produce it, and yet its production 
allows them to advertise an appealing-looking moral seriousness against 
the backdrop of economic relations which systematically harm the well-
being of the vast majority. 
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